Name: Davis* Spalding Hammond
Birth: 12 JAN 1924 in Claremont, N.H.
Death: 30 JUL 1973
Sturtevant: Edward Fuller, John Howland, John Tilley, Richard Warren
Washburn: Francis Cooke
Blanchard: William Brewster, John Howland, John Tilley
Dimmick : Gov William Bradford
Soc sec # 009 05 4164
Roster of Vermonters in WWII:
Hammond, Davis Spalding 354643 USMC E-5 b. 12 Jan 1924 Claremont, NH res Windsor, VT EAD: 07 Jan 1942 Sep: 11 Apr 1945 For ser: SPTO
(WRONG was in Co C 1st Raider Bn)
2001 - Believe he was a member of Co. Q 4th Marine Raider Battalion. "Helped care for Gerald Ayers when he died of wounds July 20th 1943, Enogai-Bairoko - New Georgia" (part of overall effort to take Japanese airfield at Munda) (Hammond in 1st Raider - Ayers was in 4th Raider-GJR)
2002 - elements of the 1st and the 4th Raiders fought together at Enogai-Bairoke - GJR
( 2002 - He was innitially assugned 21 Feb `42, to Company E of the 1st Raider BN - However men were taken from one company to another in order to bring up to strength for certain later engagements)
Later, Raiders were disbanded and became:
the Raiders became part of the 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Brigade, 3rd Marine Division.
1st Mar Raider Battn became 1st Battn above.
2nd Marine Raider Battn became Weapons Battn above
3rd Marine Raider Battn became 2nd Battn above.
4th Marine Raiders became 3rd Bn above
write to :
Marine Corps Historical Center
1254 Charles Morris St SE
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5040
My records only show Davis Hammond as being a corporal in C Company of the
First Raider Batalion. He is on their roster of April 1942.
For more information write to Mr. Jerry J.C. Beau, historian for the Raider
5139 S. Cole Roade, Bosie, ID 83709-6010. Jerry can give you more
information on his travels, ships and islands he was on.
Also have you written to:
NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER
MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS (MARINES)
9700 Page Avenue
St. Louis, MO 63132-5100
Ask for form SF-180 and fill it out and return it to St. Louis. In time you
will receive his complete military records.
If you are interested in becoming an associate member of the Raider
Association, go to
www.usmarineraiders.org for a downloadable application form and
P.S. Thanks for the item about Ayers. I don't show Hammond as being wounded
on Guam but if you confirm it with info from St. Louis please let me know so
we can update our records. Thanks.
(Believe he was hospitalized prior to Guam and had a portion of his stomach removed because of severe stomach ulsers, a common problem for the men on Guadalcanal. He eventually died at age 49 with stomach cancer.-GJR)
E-mail from Frank 5 June 2001
Little late getting back to you. George McRae can give you more information
from his files that I and if you hear from Jerry Beau he will give more
information. He is our Historian and has tons of files.
I did not know either of the two marines you mentioned. I was with the lst Bn
in D Company on the Bairoko attack. As I recall, A and C Company personnel
were used to fill B and D to capacity and they made the attack on Bairoko.
So you see there were many of us fighting with people we did not know. I
remember that I led a platoon in the Bairoko attack and my men were all new
to me. We were a hastily joined unit and not a tight knitted group.
You might get additional information by writing for records from the Naval
Personnel Center in St. Louis but you probably already that.
Gerald L. Ayers PVt 4DQ KIA Bairoko, New Georgia, BS I, 20Jul43 did receive
the Distinguished Service Cross. He is listed as being in 4DQ of the Raiders.
The 4th Raiders did not have a D company -- that would be the 1st B so maybe
he was with the lst at Bairoko. J. Beau could answer that question.
NAVY & MARINE CORPS WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE COMMITTEE
A service of Navy Chief of Information Office
Marine Corps Raider Battalions
By Jack Gallant
Then-Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson and almost 5,000
Marine Corps Raiders of World War II were legend in the South
Organized in January 1942 and disbanded just two years
later, the Raider battalions were developed as a Marine Corps
special mission force, based on the success of the British
commandos and Chinese guerrillas operating in northern China.
From Guadalcanal and the Makin Atoll to Bougainville and New
Georgia, lightly armed and intensely trained Raiders had a
three-fold mission: spearhead larger amphibious landings on
beaches thought to be inaccessible, conduct raids requiring
surprise and high speed, and operate as guerrilla units for
lengthy periods behind enemy lines.
Tested first during the Aug. 7, 1942, Guadalcanal landing,
Edsonþs Raiders, the 1st Raider Battalion, struck at Tulagi, an
island across the channel from the main landing force.
Ten days later a force of 221 from the 2nd Raider Battalion,
named "Carlson`s Raiders" for its commanding officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Evans F. Carlson, landed from two submarines on
Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll. The raid inflicted heavy damage
and forced the Japanese to divert troops from reinforcing
Edson and his Raiders, in conjunction with the Marineþs 1st
Parachute Battalion, left their mark on the Guadalcanal campaign
during the night of Sept. 13-14. The intense and vicious close
quarters fight is known as the Battle of Edsonþs Ridge or Bloody
Ridge. Among those decorated for heroism was Edson, who received
the Medal of Honor.
Refitted, rested and rearmed, the 2nd Raiders, again led by
Carlson, landed on a remote Guadalcanal beach and conducted their
famous "Thirty Days Behind the Lines" operation from Nov. 4 to
Moving up the Solomon Island chain after the capture of
Guadalcanal, the 4th Raider Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel
Michael S. Currin, slipped ashore on New Georgia in late June
1943. For two months the 4th Raiders and their colleagues from
the 1st Raider Battalion joined with other Marine and Army units
to fight a series of actions in the dense jungle and deep swamps.
Bairoko Harbor, New Georgia, in August 1943, was the final action
for these men as members of the 1st and 4th Raider battalions.
Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands at nearly
30 miles wide and 125 miles long, was the assignment of the 2nd
and 3rd Raider battalions as they led the way for the Nov. 1
The units led by Lieutenant Colonels Joseph S. McCaffery and
Fred S. Beans suffered heavy casualties during their more than
two months ashore on Bougainville as they fought beside Army and
Marine Corps troops. By mid-January the Raiders were withdrawn
from Bougainville, and less than a month later the elite Raider
battalions were disbanded.
The 1st, 3rd and 4th Raider battalions became the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd battalions of 4th Marine Regiment when that regiment was
re-established on Feb. 1, 1944, bearing the name and honors of
the original 4th regiment lost in the Philippines in 1942. The
2nd Battalion became Weapons Company, 4th Marine Regiment.
The legacy of the short-lived Raider history lives on in the
perpetual memorial of the former USS Edson (DD-946), the
destroyer bearing the name of the first Marine Raider.
Twenty-two other U.S. Navy ships are named for men of the 1st
Raider Battalion who were killed in action.
Where They Fought:
1st Raider Battalion (designated on Feb. 16, 1942) w
commanded by Lt. Col. Merritt A. Edson.
Tulagi, Solomon Islands (Aug. 7-9, 1942)
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands (Aug. 10-Oct. 16, 194
New Georgia (July 5-Aug. 28, 1943)
2nd Raider Battalion (designated Feb. 19, 1942) was
commanded by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson.
Midway Island (June 4-6, 1942)
Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll (Aug. 17-18, 1942)
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands (Nov. 4-Dec. 17, 1942)
Bougainville, Solomon Islands (Nov. 1, 1943-Jan. 1
3rd Raider Battalion (designated Sept. 20, 1942) was
commanded by Lt. Col. Harry B. Liversedge.
Pavuvu, Russell Islands (Feb. 20-March 20, 1943)
Bougainville, Solomon Islands (Nov. 1, 1943-Jan. 1
4th Raider Battalion (designated Oct. 23, 1942) was commanded
by Major James Roosevelt for 7 months, then Lt. Col. Michael S.
Currin took over in May 1943.
Vangunu Island (June 21-July 11, 1943)
New Georgia (July 18-Aug. 28, 1943)
Battalion strengths varied from 700 to 950 Marines.
Updegraph, Charles L. Jr. U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of
World War II. Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division,
Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
"General Vandegrift turned over his command to Major General Alexander
M. Patch of the US Army on January 21, 1943 though the Navy, not the Army,
remained in charge of the operations. Patch took his orders from Admiral Bull
Halsey. As he was preparing to leave the campaign, Vandegrift discussed the
highlights of the Marines’ engagement on Guadalcanal in December of 1942. For
him, a few points stood out – the initial landing on August 7th, the battle of the
Teneru on August 21st, Bloody Ridge on September 13th, and the great naval
battle for Guadalcanal which took place from November 13 through the 15th.
Vandegrift was quoted by a New York Times correspondent as saying,
“Japanese troop losses in killed have exceeded ours by more than ten to one
and more than 450 enemy planes have been destroyed in the four months’
campaign on Guadalcanal, and our positions are now stronger than ever
2 New York Times, December 12, 1942, page 6 .............................................................................................................................
Navy & Marine Corps World War II Commemorative Committee
Navy Office of Information (CHINFO)
The Pentagon, Room 2E352
Washington, DC 20350-1200
Invasion of Emirau Island March 1944
TOP OF THE LADDER: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
There were, however, two minor land operations to complete the isolation of Rabaul. The first was at Green Island, just 37 miles north of Bougainville. It was a crusty, eight-mile-long (four-mile- wide) oval ring, three islands of sand and coral around a sleepy lagoon, and only 117 miles from Rabaul. To General Douglas MacArthur, it was the last step of the Solomon Islands campaign......
........... The second operation saw the seizure of Emirau Island. It was well north of Green Island, 75 miles northwest of the New Ireland enemy fortress of Kavieng. Actually, Kavieng had been considered as a target to be invaded by the 3d Marine Division, but higher authorities decided the cost would be too high. Better to let Kavieng die on the vine. Taking Emirau and setting up air and naval bases there would effectively cut off the Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago from the Japanese. It would be a small investment with big results.
Emirau is an irregularly shaped island in the St. Matthias Group, eight miles long, four miles wide, with much jungle and many hills, but with room for boat basins and airstrips. The natives said there had been no Japanese there since January, and air reconnaissance could find none.
The unit selected for the landing bore a famous name in the lore of the Corps: the 4th Marines. The original regiment had been the storied "China Marines," and had then been part of the desperate defense of Bataan and the subsequent surrender at Corregidor in the Philippines. Now it had been reborn as a new, independent regiment, composed of the tough and battle-hardened veterans of the raider battalions.
The 4th Marines arrived at Emirau shortly after 0600 on 20 March 1944. The Marines and sailors fired a few shots at nothing; then the amphibian tractors opened up, wounding one of the Marines. The Seabees got right to work on the airfields, even before the island was secured. In no time they laid out a 7,000-foot bomber strip and a 5,000-foot stretch for fighters.
All was secured until attention fell on a little neighboring island with a Japanese fuel and ration dump. Destroyers blew it all to debris . . . then spied at sea a large canoe escaping with some of the enemy. Hardly bloodthirsty after this placid operation, the destroyer casually pulled in close. The Japanese chose to fire a machine gun. It was folly. The destroyer was forced to respond. The canoe didn't sink and was brought alongside with the body of a Japanese officer and 26 living enlisted men — who may have privately questioned their officer's judgement.
Battle of Edson's Ridge
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Battle of Edson's Ridge, also known as the Battle of the Bloody Ridge, Battle of Raiders Ridge, and Battle of the Ridge, was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II between Imperial Japanese Army and Allied (mainly United States Marine Corps) ground forces. It took place September 12–September 14, 1942 on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomon Islands, and was the second of three separate major Japanese ground offensives in the Guadalcanal campaign.
In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an attack by the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Japanese Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter that guarded Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, which was captured from the Japanese by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Kawaguchi's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces from the island.
Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, which at that time numbered about 12,000 personnel, Kawaguchi's 6,000 soldiers conducted several nighttime frontal assaults on the U.S. defenses. The main Japanese assault occurred around Lunga ridge south of Henderson Field that was manned by troops from several U.S. Marine Corps units, primarily troops from the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions under U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson. Although the U.S. Marine Corps defenses were almost overrun, Kawaguchi's attack was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers.
Because of the key participation by Edson's unit in defending the ridge, the ridge was commonly referred to as "Edson's" ridge in historical accounts of the battle in Western sources. After Edson's Ridge, the Japanese continued to send troops to Guadalcanal for further attempts to retake Henderson Field, affecting Japanese offensive operations in other areas of the South Pacific.
First nights action
Based on reports from native scouts and their own patrols, the Americans knew of the approach of the Japanese forces but did not know exactly where or when they would attack. The ridge around which Edson deployed his men consisted of three distinct hillocks. At the southern tip and surrounded on three sides by thick jungle was Hill 80 (so named because it rose 80 feet (24 m) above sea level). Six hundred yards north was Hill 123 (likewise named for its height in feet above sea level, which is 37 m), the dominant feature on the ridge. The northernmost hillock was unnamed and about 60 feet (18 m) high. Edson placed the five companies from the Raider battalion on the west side of the ridge and the three Parachute battalion companies on the east side, holding positions in depth from Hill 80 back to Hill 123. Two of the five Raider companies, "B" and "C", held a line between the ridge, a small, swampy lagoon, and the Lunga River. Machine-gun teams from "E" Company, the heavy weapons company, were scattered throughout the defenses. Edson placed his command post on Hill 123.
At 21:30 on September 12, the Japanese cruiser Sendai and three destroyers shelled the Lunga perimeter for 20 minutes and illuminated the ridge with a searchlight. Japanese artillery also began shelling the Marine lines but without doing much damage. At this same time, scattered groups of Kawaguchi's troops began skirmishing with Marines around the ridge. Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion, led by Major Yukichi Kokusho, attacked the Raider's "C" company between the lagoon and the Lunga River, overrunning at least one platoon and forcing the Marine company to fall back to the ridge. Kokusho's unit became entangled with troops from Kawaguchi's 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Kusunichi Watanabe, who were still struggling to reach their attack positions, and the resulting confusion effectively stopped the Japanese attack on the ridge that night. Kawaguchi, who was having trouble locating where he was in relation to the U.S. Marine lines as well as coordinating his troops' attacks, later complained, "Due to the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and was completely beyond my control. In my whole life I have never felt so disappointed and helpless." Twelve U.S. Marines were killed in the night's action, while Japanese casualties are unknown but perhaps somewhat greater. Although both Oka in the west and the Kuma unit in the east tried to attack the Marine lines that night, they failed to make contact and halted near the Marine lines at dawn.
At first light on September 13, Cactus Air Force aircraft and Marine artillery fired into the area just south of the ridge, forcing any Japanese still out in the open to seek cover in the nearby jungle. The Japanese suffered several casualties, including two officers from Watanabe's battalion. At 05:50, Kawaguchi decided to regroup his forces for another attack that night.
Second night's action on the ridge
Expecting the Japanese to attack again that night, Edson directed his troops to improve their defenses on and around the ridge. After a failed attempt by two companies to retake the ground on the Marine right flank lost to Kokusho the night before, Edson repositioned his forces. He pulled his front back about 400 yards (370 m) to a line that stretched 1,800 yards (1,600 m), starting at the Lunga River and crossing the ridge about 150 yards (140 m) south of Hill 123. Around and behind Hill 123 he placed five companies. Any Japanese attackers surmounting Hill 80 would have to advance over 400 yards (370 m) of open terrain to close with the Marine positions at Hill 123. With only a few hours to prepare, the Marines were only able to construct rudimentary and shallow fortifications. Also, the Marines were low on ammunition, with one or two grenades for each Marine. Vandegrift ordered a reserve force consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (2/5) to move into a position just to the rear of Edson's troops. In addition, a battery (four guns) of 105mm howitzers from the 11th Marine Regiment moved to a location from which it could provide direct fire onto the ridge, and a forward artillery observer was placed with Edson's front line units.
Late in the afternoon, Edson stepped onto a grenade box and addressed his exhausted troops, saying,
"You men have done a great job, and I have just one more thing to ask of you. Hold out just one more night. I know we've been without sleep a long time. But we expect another attack from them tonight and they may come through here. I have every reason to believe that we will have reliefs here for all of us in the morning."
Edson's speech "raised the spirits" of the Raiders and helped them prepare mentally for the night ahead.
As the sun set on September 13, Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Marines with 3,000 troops of his brigade, plus an assortment of light artillery. The night was pitch black, with no moon. At 21:00, seven Japanese destroyers briefly bombarded the ridge. Kawaguchi's attack began just after nightfall, with Kokusho's battalion assaulting Raider Company B on the Marine right flank, just to the west of the ridge. The force of the assault caused Company B to fall back to Hill 123. Under Marine artillery fire, Kokusho reassembled his men and continued his attack. Without pausing to try to "roll-up" the other nearby Marine units, whose flanks were now unprotected, Kokusho's unit surged forward through the swampy lowlands between the ridge and the Lunga River, heading for the airfield. Kokusho's men came upon a pile of Marine supplies and rations. Not having eaten adequately for a couple of days, they paused to "gorge themselves" on the "C" and "K" rations. Kokusho ordered his men to continue the attack. At about 03:00, he led them against the Marine units around the northern portion of the ridge, just short of the airfield, as well as Hill 123. In the heavy fighting that followed, Kokusho and around 100 of his men were killed, ending that attack.
Meanwhile, Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion, under Major Masao Tamura, assembled for their planned assault against Hill 80 from the jungle south of the ridge. Marine observers spotted Tamura's preparations and called in artillery fire. At about 22:00 a barrage from twelve 105 mm cannons hit Tamura's position. In response, two companies of Tamura's troops, numbering about 320 men, charged up Hill 80 with fixed bayonets behind their own barrage of mortar fire and grenades. Tamura's attack hit Company B of the Marine Parachute battalion and also Raider Company B, pushing the Parachutists off the east side of the ridge into a draw below the ridgeline. To protect the exposed Raider Company B, Edson immediately ordered them to pull back onto Hill 123.
At the same time, a Japanese company from Watanabe's battalion infiltrated through a gap between the east side of the ridge and Parachute Company C. Deciding that their positions were now untenable, Parachute Companies B and C climbed onto the ridge and retreated to a position behind Hill 123. In the darkness and confusion of the battle, the retreat quickly became confused and disorganized. A few Marines began yelling that the Japanese were attacking with poison gas, scaring other Marines who no longer possessed their gas masks. After arriving behind Hill 123, some of the Marines continued on towards the airfield, repeating the word "withdraw" to anyone within earshot. Other Marines began to follow them. Just at the moment that it appeared that the Marines on the hill were about to break and head for the rear in a rout, Edson, Major Kenneth D. Bailey from Edson's staff, and other Marine officers appeared and, with "vivid" language, herded the Marines back into defensive positions around Hill 123.
.As the Marines formed into a horseshoe shaped line around Hill 123, Tamura's battalion began a series of frontal assaults on the hill, charging up the saddle from Hill 80 and up from below the east side of the ridge. Under the light of parachute flares dropped by at least one Japanese floatplane, the Marines repulsed the first two attacks by Tamura's men. Tamura's troops hoisted a 75mm "regimental" gun to the top of Hill 80 in an effort to fire it directly at the Marines. This gun, which "could have turned the tide in favor of the Japanese," however, was disabled by a faulty firing pin. At midnight, during a short lull in the fighting, Edson ordered Parachute Companies B and C to advance from behind Hill 123 to strengthen his left flank. With fixed bayonets, the Paramarines swept forward, killing Japanese soldiers who had overrun the Marine lines and were apparently preparing to roll-up the Marine lines from the flank, and took position on the east side of the hill. Marines from other units, as well as members of Edson's command staff, including Major Bailey, brought forward ammunition and grenades under fire to the Marines around Hill 123, who were running critically low. Said Marine participant Captain William J. McKennan, "The Japanese attack was almost constant, like a rain that subsides for a moment and then pours the harder...When one wave was mowed down - and I mean mowed down - another followed it into death."
The Japanese hit Edson's left flank just after the Parachutists took position but were again stopped by Marine rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and grenade fire. Marine 105 mm and 75 mm artillery was also taking a heavy toll on the attacking Japanese. A captured Japanese soldier later said that his unit was "annihilated" by the Marine artillery fire, from which only 10% of his company survived.
By 04:00, after withstanding several more assaults, some of which resulted in hand-to-hand fighting, as well as severe sniper fire from all sides, Edson's men were joined by troops from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, who helped repulse two more Japanese attacks before dawn. Throughout the night, as Kawaguchi's men came close to, but not quite, overrunning the Marine defenses, Edson remained standing about 20 yards (18 m) behind the Marine firing line on Hill 123, exhorting his troops and directing their defensive efforts. Said Marine Captain Tex Smith, who was in position to observe Edson for most of the night, "I can say that if there is such a thing as one man holding a battalion together, Edson did it that night. He stood just behind the front lines – stood, when most of us hugged the ground."
During the heavy fighting, portions of three Japanese companies, including two from Tamura's and one from Watanabe's battalions, skirted the Marine defenses on the ridge, while taking heavy losses from Marine gunfire, and reached the edge of "Fighter One," a secondary runway of Henderson Field. A counterattack by the Marine engineers stopped one Japanese company's advances and forced it to retreat. The other two companies waited at the edge of the jungle for reinforcements to arrive before attacking into the open area around the airfield. When no reinforcements joined them, both companies went back to their original positions south of the ridge after daybreak. Most of the rest of Watanabe's battalion did not participate in the battle because they lost contact with their commander during the night.
As the sun rose on September 14, pockets of Japanese soldiers remained scattered along both sides of the ridge. But, with Tamura's battalion shattered, having lost three-quarters of its officers and men, and with heavy casualties to his other attacking units as well, Kawaguchi's assault on the ridge had effectively ended. About 100 Japanese soldiers still remained in the open on the south slope of Hill 80, perhaps preparing for one more charge on Hill 123. At first light, three U.S. Army fighter aircraft from the 67th Fighter Squadron at Henderson Field, acting on a request personally delivered by Bailey, strafed the Japanese near Hill 80 and killed most of them, with the few survivors retreating back into the jungle.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Bairoko Harbor is situated along the northwestern shore of the island of New Georgia in the Solomon Islands.
During World War II Japan used Bairoko Harbor to resupply its forces at Munda Point, an airstrip situated along the south coast of New Georgia. Allied forces deemed Munda critical for control of this section of the Solomon Islands and necessary for the continued progress northward toward Japan.
After capturing Enogai, a village situated a few miles east of Bairoko Harbor, the Northern Landing Group of United States Marines comprising the 1st and 4th Marine Raider Battalions assaulted the harbor on June 20, 1943. Greatly outmanned, the lightly-armed Marines failed to overcome the deeply entrenched, heavily armed Japanese defenders and were turned back after horrific losses in dense jungle fighting.
The loss marked the first time the Marine Raiders had failed to take an objective, and was blamed in part on failure of the United States Army Air Corps to provide air support for the operation as requested. The battle caused the Joint Chiefs to rethink the strategy of pitting lightly-armed forces against well-fortified enemy forces, and the operation planners drew the criticism of the Joint Chiefs for having marginalized the entire operation "as if it had been a sideshow".
Unable to prevent the loss of Munda to the Allies due to assaults on the airstrip by other forces, the Japanese evacuated the entire island of New Georgia via Bairoko Harbor within a month of the initial attack. From New Georgia the Allies continuted "up the slot" toward Japan, fighting next at Bougainville.
Pvt Gerald L.Ayres of the 4th Raiders was wounded while taking an enemy machine gun bunker for which he received the Distinguished Service Cross. He died of his wounds before he could be evacuated. Davis Hammond of 1st Raiders, taking part in this operation, apparently, according to his father in his book on the Hammonds of West Windsor, helped care for Ayers before he died. GJR
Father: Winston* Dwight Hammond b: 15 DEC 1899 in W.Windsor, Vt.
Mother: Marguerite Eva Duncan b: 23 AUG 1896 in Windsor, Vt.
- Living Hammond
- Living Hammond
- Living Hammond